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Somali waters have high fisheries production potential, but the sustainability of those
fisheries is compromised by the presence of foreign fishing vessels, many of them
fishing illegally. The Somali domestic fishing sector is small and relatively nascent, but
foreign vessels have fished in Somali waters for at least seven decades. Some foreign
vessels and their crew have been a direct, physical threat to Somali artisanal fishers.
Many foreign vessels directly compete for fish, reducing fish populations and destroying
marine habitat through bottom trawling. In this paper, we reconstruct foreign catch in
Somali waters from 1981–2014 and classify the health of seventeen commercial fish
stocks. Foreign fishing has increased more than twenty-fold since 1981, and the most
rapid increase occurred during the 1990s after the collapse of the Federal government
and ensuing civil war. We estimate foreign fishing vessels caught 92,500 mt of fish in
2014, almost twice that caught by the Somali domestic fleet. Iran (48%) and Yemen
(31%) accounted for the vast majority of foreign fish catch in the most recent year
of analysis. Although responsible for only 6% of total foreign catch, trawl vessels
disproportionately impact public perception of foreign fishing. We find they trawled
over 120,000 km2 of marine seabed in nearshore waters during 2010–2014. Foreign
IUU fishing in Somali waters is fueling public anger and perpetuating conflict in five
ways: by directly competing with the domestic fishery; through links to piracy; through
nearshore illegal and destructive bottom trawling; by contributing to regional political
conflict over vessel licensing; and by reducing long-term livelihood security. Significant
levels of foreign fishing combined with inconsistent governance means Somalis are not
fully benefiting from the exploitation of their marine resources at a local or national level,
leading to insecurity at both scales.
Keywords: IUU fishing, Somalia, fisheries conflict, distant water fishing nations, sustainability, fisheries
governance, trawling, foreign fishing

INTRODUCTION
Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by foreign fishing vessels in Somali waters has
been problematic for decades (Musse and Tako, 1999; Lehr and Lehmann, 2007; Weldemichael,
2012; Sumaila and Bawumia, 2014). The central government collapsed in 1991, and the ensuing
increase in foreign fishing became a justification for piracy against fishing vessels (Weldemichael,
2012; Sumaila and Bawumia, 2014). Successful pirate attacks and large ransom payments turned
the attention of pirate gangs to more valuable merchant vessels. The growing risk of piracy caused
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The presence of foreign fishing vessels has been a source
of conflict in the Somali maritime space for decades. Here, we
outline some of the mechanisms driving this conflict and provide
quantitative support. This research builds from Glaser et al.
(2015) with updated numbers and methods for estimating catch
by foreign vessels. We argue all foreign fishing in Somali waters
is unregulated, most is unreported to Somali authorities, and
unknown amounts of it are illegal. Consequently, IUU fishing by
foreign vessels is a significant threat to Somali fisheries. While
the mere presence of foreign fishing vessels causes direct and
visible conflict with the domestic sector, the indirect effects of
foreign trawling and potential declines in valuable fish stocks
exacerbates these effects.

some distant water fishing fleets targeting tuna to avoid Somali
waters during the mid-2000s (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
[IOTC], 2013). While piracy has declined (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2014), foreign fishing within sight of Somali communities
continues to galvanize public anger (Anon, 2015b).
Most foreign fishing in Somali waters is either illegal,
unreported, or unregulated. The Somali Fisheries Law, passed
in December 2014 (Federal Republic of Somalia Ministry of
Natural Resources, 2014), banned bottom trawling by domestic
and foreign vessels (Article 33), made all prior licenses null and
void (Article 10), and reserved the first 24 nm of Somali waters
for Somali fishers (Article 3).
Prior to passage of this law, however, the designation as
“legal” or “illegal” for any specific foreign vessel was politically
and legally complicated. Before the UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1972, Somalia designated
its 200-nm zone a territorial sea. UNCLOS designates this
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Consequently, nations
challenged Somalia’s territorial waters claim and used it as
an excuse to fish in Somali waters beyond 12 nm without
licenses. Foreign vessels also obtained licenses from nongovernmental sources, such as local authorities, local leaders, or
even warlords (Anon, 2010a; Sumaila and Bawumia, 2014; BBC,
2015). Corruption around these de facto licenses was widespread
(Schbley and Rosenau, 2013), and captains and owners of foreign
vessels were either ignorant of or complicit in such corruption.
In some cases, license fees were exchanged for “protection”
from pirates. Vessels from Yemen directly traded ice and fuel
for access to fish in Somali waters (Lovatelli, 1996). All told,
a significant number of foreign vessels took advantage of the
instability in Somalia and never attempted to obtain a fishing
license from any authority (Glaser et al., 2015). Disagreement and
confusion over authority to issue licenses made many countries
hesitant to engage in those modalities and encouraged some
fleets to circumvent legal channels or refuse to fish in Somali
waters at all. Finally, some fleets were offered protection by
regional political elites–including protection from pirate attacks
and the presence on-board of armed Somali guards–which
destabilized the maritime space and the procurement of legal
licenses (Dua, 2013).
A significant amount of fishing in Somali waters goes
unreported to the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).
Domestic and foreign vessels are now legally required to report
all catch (Somali Fisheries Law, Article 24), but the FGS does
not have the capacity to collect nationwide catch statistics, and
they have not reported catch to the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) since 1988 (Glaser et al., 2015). While
foreign vessels that catch tuna should report to the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission (IOTC), foreign vessels in Somali waters
that are not catching species under IOTC management do not
report to any agency.
Finally, Somalia does not have sufficient management
measures to regulate fishing in their waters. Existing regulations
are not enforced, and scientific studies are decades old (Stromme,
1984). Consequently, detailed fisheries knowledge does not
exist. Unregulated fishing increases the risk of overfishing, and
management without regular scientific input can lead to resource
depletion (Pitcher et al., 2002; Agnew et al., 2009).
Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

MATERIALS AND METHODS
Quantifying Foreign Fishing in Somali
Waters
We combined three approaches: (1) spatial allocation of
RFMO-reported catch of highly migratory species (HMS) done
by the Sea Around Us (Cashion et al., 2018), (2) catch
reconstruction, and (3) analysis of Automatic Identification
Systems (AIS) vessel broadcast data. Where available, we used
information on catch composition to allocate catch into species
or taxonomic groups. Following Pitcher et al. (2002), we
created a detailed fishery timeline through extensive searches
of the literature, expert interviews, and conversations with
Somalis (available at http://securefisheries.org/sites/default/files/
SomaliFisheriesTimeline.xlsx). We began our estimation in 1981,
when foreign fishing began to proliferate.

Spatial Allocation of Highly Migratory Species Catch
Catch of highly migratory species (HMS) was estimated using
the spatialized industrial large pelagic catch data of the Sea
Around Us at the University of British Columbia (Le Manach
et al., 2016). This dataset harmonizes data from those Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) that manage
large pelagic species fisheries including tuna, billfishes, and sharks
and reconstructed discard estimates of these fisheries. Members
of RFMOs report annually on the amount of fishing catch and
effort by gear and location. For Somali waters, the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission (IOTC) is the relevant RFMO and it manages
16 species of tuna and billfishes plus commonly caught shark
species (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2010). Le
Manach et al. (2016) provide a detailed and technical discussion
of this methodology.
We selected catch allocations provided by the Sea Around Us
(seaaroundus.org, downloaded March 18, 2018) for fish catch
in the Somali EEZ for commercial groups Tuna/Billfishes and
Sharks/Rays for the following IOTC-reporting countries: China,
France, Japan, South Korea, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, and
the United Kingdom. Spain and Portugal are part of the EU party.
Russia is no longer a party to the IOTC, but they were during the
1990s when they were fishing around Somalia. These countries
have a history of reporting spatially explicit data to the IOTC
and our creation of the fishery timeline documented a historical
presence in Somali waters.
2
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records (Somali Democratic Republic Ministry of Fisheries,
and Marine Transport [MFMT], 1988) show five additional
Italian trawlers operated in 1988 and we applied the average
annual catch from the five SHIFCO vessels (3,440 mt) to
this datum. This value is bolstered by a report (Van Zalinge,
1988) that one SHIFCO trawler landed 1,245 mt in 1987.
Catch composition also was obtained from Panapesca record
sheets. For most reporting periods, finfishes were aggregated
across species. However, for records from August 2000 and
September 2006, we obtained family level data. We applied
this composition breakdown to the larger “fish” categories
from remaining reporting periods. All five former SHIFCO
vessels stopped operating in Somali waters in 2006 due to high
fuel costs.

Catch Reconstruction
We modified an established approach to catch reconstruction
from Zeller et al. (2007) and Pauly et al. (2014) as follows: first,
verify a nation’s fishing presence in Somali waters using searches
of the literature and expert input; second, estimate the number of
fishing vessels from a particular nation; third, estimate total catch
by amount and species composition (where available) for that
nation (referred to as anchor points); fourth, extrapolate catch
between anchor point years; finally, generate 95% confidence
intervals for catch reconstruction time lines using a Monte
Carlo simulation and sampling ranges of vessel numbers and
catch amounts (Glaser et al., 2015). Confidence intervals from
the Monte Carlo simulation were used to provide estimates of
uncertainty across all estimates.
This reconstruction approach was used to estimate catch for
Italy, Yemen, Iran, Egypt, Kenya, Greece, and Thailand. Details
of reconstructions on a country-by-country basis follow.

Yemen
One of the earliest mentions of fishing by Yemen occurs in
Yassin (1981), in which he refers to a concern about shared
resource management for the Indian oil sardine. There is no
mention of Yemeni boats crossing over into Somali waters; it
is implied that the resource spans both territories. Therefore,
we take 1981 as an anchor point for which Yemeni catch in
Somali waters was zero. Twelve Yemeni vessels were arrested
in Somali waters in 2006 (our minimum number of vessels),
and the UN claims as many as 300 Yemeni vessels fish in
Somali waters each year (United Nations Security Council,
2013). The State Minister for Fisheries and Marine Resources
in Puntland reported that Yemeni vessels carry between 3–
7 mt of fish per trip, make three trips per month, and visit
Somali waters each month out of the year (Kulmiye, 2010).
Therefore, our Monte Carlo simulations of catch by Yemeni
vessels calculated annual catch by sampling over a triangle
distribution limited by minimums of 12 vessels per year and
108 mt per vessel, and maximums of 300 vessels per year and
252 mt per vessel. This estimate was applied to 2006–2014, and
catch was linearly interpolated back to 1981 (where the anchor
point was zero).
Yemen reported catch to the IOTC during the period of
2003–2007, and we used the reported IOTC data to guide our
species composition estimates: yellowfin (48%); other tunas such
as longtail, narrow-barred Spanish mackerel, frigate tuna, and
kawakawa (combined with undifferentiated tuna, 38%); and
sharks (5%). All data reported to the IOTC originate from boats
deploying handlines.

Italy
Italian vessels fished for tuna during the 1930s through 1950s,
but data on volume and catch composition were not available.
Three trawlers fishing for Amoroso e Figli operated during
1978–1979, but catch estimates were not available. We collected
reliable information on trawlers operating through the joint
ventures SOMITFISH (1981–1983) and SHIFCO (1987–2006)
(Shifco, 1998). Our reconstruction posits the following: from
1981–1983 three trawlers were operating for SOMITFISH, and
from 1987–1989 three trawlers were operating for SHIFCO.
In 1987, SHIFCO added two trawlers to its fleet. These
vessels were similar in capacity, ranging from 57–66 m in
length. Vessels were flagged to Somalia until 1998, and that
catch should be attributed to the Somali domestic fleet. Joint
venture rules require catch from joint venture vessels be
attributed to the flag country. Therefore, catch from these vessels
during 1981–1998 should be included in volumes reported by
Somalia to the FAO and in the domestic reconstruction of
Cashion et al. (2018). When SHIFCO vessels were reflagged,
catch should be considered foreign. We assign the flag to
Italy because of the history of the joint venture and the
exclusive purchasing rights of an Italian import company,
Panapesca SpA.
Records of catch and composition by the five SHIFCO trawlers
were obtained from Panapesca SpA. Catch was reported in
kilograms for various fishery taxa aggregated across all vessels
but specific to a fishing campaign (approximately 55 days in
length). Records covered August 2000 to September 2006. Annual
catch (metric tons) was calculated from these records, and the
average catch over the period of observation (3,440 mt) was
extrapolated back from 1999 to 1990. Prior to 1990, catch
was reduced to 60% of the average observed catch (2,064 mt)
because only three trawlers were operating during that period.
One trawler, the Antoinette Madre, operated in at least 1984
(Bihi, 1984). Two trawlers landed fish and lobster in 1985, and
values (1,313 and 679 mt) were reported by Somali Democratic
Republic Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources [MFMR]
(1985). We used the average catch by these two trawlers to
estimate catch for the Antoinette Madre in 1984 (996 mt). Finally,
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Iran
Our approach to estimating catch from Iran was identical
to that used to estimate catch by Yemen. Reports in the
literature indicate Iran has a minimum of 5 (Anon, 2013)
and a maximum of 180 gillnet vessels operating in Somali
waters (United Nations Security Council, 2013). Capacity for
fish on each vessel was not available. We therefore used global
estimates for gillnet vessels to obtain a range of catch per
year. Pauly et al. (2014) estimated catch capacity for gillnet
vessels as 221 mt per year (average) and 1,211 mt per year
(maximum). Waugh et al. (2011) estimated the minimum
capacity of these vessels to be 16 mt per year. Our simulation
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Maritime Organization to broadcast AIS. Many fishing vessels
smaller than 300 GT may broad AIS voluntarily for safety reasons.
Preliminary observation of AIS pings (purchased from a
subscription to ShipView) and expert input identified seven
vessels flagged to South Korea that were likely bottom trawling
in Somali waters. These vessels ranged in size from 49–68 m
long and 439–888 GT. Using the Maritime Mobile Service
Identity (MMSI) numbers associated with these seven vessels, we
purchased satellite AIS data for all seven boats from exactEarth
(Cambridge, Ontario, Canada, March 26, 2015). These data
include every broadcast point from the ships in question during
July 2010 through December 2014. Each point includes a position
(latitude/longitude) as well as associated vessel information such
as IMO number, vessel name, flag, size, date, time, speed over
ground (SOG), and course over ground. Vessel operators can
control when and what they broadcast. Often points had missing
information (e.g., SOG was not included in a broadcast) or AIS
may have been turned off altogether, creating gaps in the dataset.
As a result, estimates made from these data are conservative.
Using ArcGIS 10.3, we identified transmissions within the
boundaries of the Somali EEZ. Then, using SOG communicated
during those transmissions, we classified where the vessels were
actively trawling by creating a histogram of SOG (Figure 2), and
choosing the range of speeds defining the peak in SOG. This
method of using SOG distributions to identify trawling activity
has been shown to correctly identify 99% of real trawling activity
(Mills et al., 2006). Trawlers 2 and 6 were present in Somali waters
and were likely trawling but did not broadcast SOG.
Next, we used the times and dates of transmissions during
active trawling to calculate the number of days trawled during
the time period for which we had AIS data. If there were
multiple transmissions at trawling speed in 1 day, we classified
that as a trawling day. Each vessel was in Somali waters for
differing durations, so we counted trawling days per boat and
then calculated the ratio of active trawling days to the number
of days in a year for which AIS transmissions were available. This
ratio was then multiplied by 365, generating an estimate of days
trawled per year for each vessel. Using the same procedure, we
calculated the mean proportion of days trawled per month across
all boats. To estimate active trawling days per month for the two
vessels that did not broadcast SOG, we determined the number
of days per month those two vessels were in the Somali EEZ, then
multiplied by the mean proportion of days trawled calculated
from the other boats during the associated month.
Because the dataset for each boat did not always include an
entire year of data at the beginning and end, we used a similar
proportional method to estimate days trawling per year for all
seven boats. For a single boat, we took the proportion of days
trawled to the number of days over which we had data in a given
year, then multiplied by the number of days in that year.
We obtained ocean depth at the location of AIS transmission
by overlaying transmission points with a bathymetry raster
(GEBCO Compilation Group, 2019). To calculate the total area
trawled, we used the mean SOG from all boats during active
trawling and multiplied by a likely width of the trawl for vessels
of comparable size (49 m; Gomez and Jiminez, 1994) and by the
average number of hours spent trawling per day. For robustness,

therefore resampled triangle distributions estimating number of
vessels and fish capacity.

Egypt
Trawling by Egyptian vessels began in 1981. Haakonsen (1983)
reported “a few” and no more than 10 trawlers operating in the
early 1980s, split between Italy and Egypt. Knowing Italy had
three trawlers operating in 1981, we assigned a conservative three
trawlers as an anchor point in 1981. Further, we assigned anchor
points of 36 trawlers during 2003–2006 (Berbera Maritime and
Fisheries Academy, 2013) and 34 trawlers in 2007 (Anon, 2012).
Published estimates of catch by these trawlers are 30 mt per
trawler per month; of that, 5% of catch was shrimp and the
remainder was finfish. We extrapolated back to zero catch in
1981. Variable estimates of numbers of boats or capacity were
not available, so we did not conduct Monte Carlo simulations to
estimate confidence intervals.

Kenya
Since 2004, Kenyan trawlers fished for prawns along the Juba
River on the border with Somalia (Bocha, 2012). Waldo (2009)
reports 19 illegal trawlers caught 800 mt of prawns each year
since that time. We did not conduct Monte Carlo simulations
for Kenyan catch.

Greece
Greek vessels have been trawling in Somali waters since the 1960s.
“A few” trawlers were operating in the mid-1960s (Haakonsen,
1983) and “a number of ” additional trawlers were fishing in
1983 (Bihi, 1984). From 1983–2010 we uncovered no evidence
of trawling from Greece. In 2010, two Greek trawlers flagged to
Belize, the Greko 1 and Greko 2, appeared. We therefore estimated
two trawlers fishing in 1983 and two from 2010–2014. These
vessels operated in Southern Somalia and may have been properly
licensed. We found no information on catch rate but each vessel
was 193 gross tonnage (GT, MarineTraffic.com, 2015), so we
assumed the vessels were similar in catch composition and catch
rate to the Korean-flagged trawlers described below. Therefore,
we used the same fish catch per GT from the Korean trawlers
(1.16 mt per GT) to the Greek trawlers, equaling 447 mt per year.

Thailand
From 2005 to 2009, seven Thai trawlers, owned by Sirichai, were
licensed to fish year-round in Puntland. The trawlers operated
continuously 6 months by transshipping to a Thai freezer ship in
Somali waters, and they went to the port in Salalah (Oman) for
repairs and unloading twice a year (Fry, 2009). We did not find
reports of catch for these vessels. Given the similarity in location
and gear, we used the reconstruction of catch for Korean trawlers
(see below) for these vessels, equaling 785 mt of fish catch per
year. Thai vessels reportedly stopped operating in Somali waters
by 2009, although in 2018 their presence has again been observed.

Automatic Identification System Analysis of
South Korean Trawl Fleet
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) are used for collision
avoidance and tracking of vessels at sea. Vessels greater than 300
GT, including fishing vessels, are required by the International
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Specifically, for fishery i, fish family type j, and calendar
year t, a multivariate panel regression model estimated
B/BMSY as:

we also calculated straight-line distance trawled per boat per day.
For each AIS transmission point, we drew a straight line to the
next consecutive point, then calculated the combined distance of
all the line segments for a single day. We multiplied this distance
by the assumed width of the trawl to get a second estimate of
total trawled area.
Weight and species composition of catch were obtained from
catch certificates submitted to the European Union for two of the
vessels. The dated certificates spanned 7 months and contained
catch by species of fish and invertebrates for each month. From
the AIS data, we know how many days per month those two
trawlers were operating in Somali waters. To estimate catch per
day for a trawler, we divided catch per month by the number of
days trawled in the same month.

log(B/BMSY )ijt = α + βXijt + γi + δt + εijt
where α is a constant term, β relates the fishery characteristic
Xijt to B/BMSY , γi is a family fixed effect, δ is a time trend
effect, and eijt is an error term. For the fish groups we
included, data for fish maximum length were available
but von Bertalanffy K, geographic distribution, and
temperature preference were not uniformly available.
We therefore chose Model 5 published in Costello et al.’s
supplementary materials.
Most parameters were calculated directly from the time series
of catch. Maximum length data were obtained from FishBase
(Froese and Pauly, 2014). We created a database of over 800
species known to occur in Somali waters (available at http:
//securefisheries.org/report/securing-somali-fisheries) and these
species guided our choice of length values to select from
FishBase. To calculate a length value to include in the regression
model, for a given family/species group, we averaged maximum
length values for the species that occur in Somali waters.
Although the Cashion et al. (2018) domestic reconstruction
extends back to 1950, we truncated the time series to cover
only 1981–2014 to overlap with our foreign reconstruction.
Catch data were most robust from 1981–1987 due to relatively
more reliable data collection and reporting by the Ministry of
Fisheries under the Siad Barre regime (Fry, 2009). Following
Costello et al., we further truncated catch time series to
begin once catch reached 15% of the maximum value in the
record. This reduces noise associated with behavior attributed
to fishery “ramp-up” in the early years of a fishery. For
most series, the value in 1981 was greater than 15% of
maximum catch, so no further truncation was applied. All
analyzed catch time series had at least 7 years of continuous
data, the minimum required by Costello et al. to make
the approach valid.
We report sustainability classifications for IOTC-assessed
species (yellowfin tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, swordfish,
longtail tuna, blue marlin, and striped marlin) based on their
formal stock assessments. Given these highly migratory species
are in Somali waters only part of the year, our estimates of annual
catch for them in Somali waters are not appropriate for the
panel regression approach to classification. Additionally, IOTC
brings expert analysis and knowledge to bear on these species.
Their approach calculates B/BMSY as well as F/FMSY (where F
is fishing mortality). They classify sustainability according to a
red-orange-yellow-green 4-cell contingency (e.g., Indian Ocean
Tuna commission [IOTC], 2014) that incorporates B/BMSY and
F/FMSY . To make their analysis comparable to ours, we translated
those species classified as orange to green, and those classified as
yellow to red. For current stock assessments and classifications,
see http://www.iotc.org/science/status-summary-species-tunaand-tuna-species-under-iotc-mandate-well-other-speciesimpacted-iotc.

Sustainability Analysis
The sustainability of fish stocks in Somali waters has never been
assessed, and most stocks lack the data necessary for nationallevel stock assessment. We classified the sustainability of Somalia’s
fish stocks at current levels of foreign and domestic catch using
methods developed for data-poor fisheries (Costello et al., 2012).
We chose species groups that are commercially valuable and
had sufficient data for analysis, excluding tuna and billfishes.
These latter groups are analyzed by the IOTC and we report
their sustainability classifications. We used our estimates of catch
for dolphinfish, emperors, goatfish, jacks, clupeids (sardines),
snappers, sharks, rays, groupers, and grunts.
Sustainability was classified based on models used to predict
the ratio of biomass (B) to biomass needed for maximum
sustainable yield (BMSY ). We used the panel regression model
developed by Costello et al. (2012) to estimate B/BMSY for these
ten fish groups. Where catch time series were reported for
species, they were aggregated up to the family (or near-family)
level. We combined catch reconstructions of Somali domestic
fisheries (Persson et al., 2015; Cashion et al., 2018) with our
estimates of foreign fishing to create estimates of total catch for
these species groups.
B/BMSY is a measure of the current standing stock (B) of a
fish stock compared to the biomass needed to support MSY. For
B/BMSY < 1.0, biomass is below that needed for MSY, and fishing
should be reduced to improve sustainability. For B/BMSY > 1.0,
biomass is above that needed for MSY, and fishing levels should
stay the same or potentially increase. B/BMSY is a function of
a suite of fishery characteristics, including (but not limited to)
life history characteristics such as size, growth patterns, or age
at reproductive maturity, and catch characteristics such as how
quickly a fishery developed, how long it has existed, or whether
catch has peaked. Costello et al. created a regression model
that relates B/BMSY to these characteristics. They analyzed 204
assessed (data-rich) stocks from around the world. The B/BMSY
calculated for these stocks was validated by independent stock
assessments. Six nested regression models, each containing a
different set of explanatory variables to accommodate varying
data availability, were generated. Next, the coefficients estimated
for these 204 stocks were then applied to 1,793 unassessed
(data-poor) stocks to estimate B/BMSY . We used their published
coefficients on each catch time series mentioned above.
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TABLE 1 | Catch (mt) of by foreign-flagged fishing vessels in Somalia’s
exclusive economic zone.
Flag country

1981–2014

2010–2014

China

2,430

0

France

92,943

138

Japan

1,875

0

South Korea

75,706

28,854

Portugal

363

0

2,539

0

Spain

216,061

623

Taiwan

33,564

0

178

0

Russian
Federation

United Kingdom
Italy

74,306

0

Kenya

8,000

3,200

Yemen
Iran
Egypt

608,374 (232,964–1,051,604)

144,851 (55,468–250,382)

1,076,526 (220,206–2,551,700)

224,265 (44,940–520,755)

298,260

61,200

Greece

2,682

2,235

Thailand

27,510

35

2,521,318

465,401

Total

FIGURE 1 | Estimated (reconstructed) catch by foreign and domestic fishing
vessels in Somalia’s exclusive economic zone, 1981–2014. Domestic catch
reconstruction by Cashion et al. (2018).

Periods show historical coverage of this study and more recent time windows for
reference. Point estimates are based on reported catch and should be considered
a minimum possible amount. Confidence intervals (95%) were added to Yemen and
Iran because estimates were derived from simulations.

RESULTS
Foreign Fishing in Somali Waters

FIGURE 2 | Histogram of speed over ground (knots) reported by Automatic
Identification System pings from seven South Korean-flagged trawlers during
2010–2014. Active trawling was classified from SOG distribution.

We estimate foreign fishing vessels operating in the EEZ of
Somalia landed approximately 2,521,318 mt of fish between 1981
and 2014 (Table 1 and Figure 1). During that same period, Somali
domestic fishing vessels caught only 1,182,995 mt (Cashion et al.,
2018). In 2014, foreign vessels caught 92,537 mt, nearly twice
as much as the Somali domestic catch of 54,177 mt. The peak
of foreign fishing occurred in 2003 (132,458 mt) as smaller
regional fleets became firmly established, but before distant water
fleets withdrew from Somali waters to reduce the risk of piracy
(Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2008). In 2014, Iran
and Yemen accounted for 79% of all fish caught by foreign
vessels in Somali waters. There is considerable uncertainty in
these estimates. Our Monte Carlo simulations of Yemen and Iran
provide confidence intervals, which are quite wide. For estimates
based on reported catch, there are not estimates of uncertainty
but the point estimates should be considered a minimum.

and a peak in pirate activity (Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015) that
caused vessels to avoid Somali waters. In 2014, we estimate
distant water fishing nations caught only 532 mt of HMS
in Somali waters.

Catch Reconstruction
Italy
Fishing by Italian vessels in Somali waters follows their
colonization of the Horn of Africa. As early as the 1930s,
Italy operated two tuna canneries in northern Somalia (Bihi,
1984). Italian vessels fished for tuna through the 1950s and
trawling for coastal demersal fishes (mostly reef-associated) and
cephalopods lasted from the late 1970s until 2006. We estimate
Italian trawlers landed 74,000 mt of fish between 1981–2006.
After Italian trawlers departed in 2006, South Korean trawlers
took over the same fishing grounds and export market.

Spatial Allocation of HMS Catch
Fishing by distant water fishing nations in Somali waters has
declined significantly in recent years. These fleets of purse seine
and longline vessels target tuna and other large pelagics as they
migrate through the Western Indian Ocean. In 2003, we estimate
these fleets caught about 44,000 mt of HMS in Somali waters. The
decline in catch around 2005 was driven by several factors: the
movement of all purse seine vessels out of Somali waters (Chassot
et al., 2010), the southward movement of the purse seine and
longline fleets (Indian Ocean Tuna commission [IOTC], 2014),
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We find fishing boats from Yemen began appearing in the waters
around Somalia, especially near Somaliland, in the early 1980s
(Yassin, 1981). At the time, arrangements between Yemeni and
Somali fishers was mutually agreeable and access agreements
were available. In Puntland, Yemeni fishers purchased fish from
Somali fishers and, until recently, this was a major trade.
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Yassin (1981) anticipated future conflict over the migrating
Indian oil sardine if cross-border fishing continued. We estimate
that, in the most recent years of analysis, Yemen caught 28,970 mt
of fish in Somali waters each year (CI90% = 11,094–50,076 mt).
The civil war in Yemen, which began in 2015, has significantly
reduced the number of Yemeni vessels coming to fish in Somali
waters (Glaser, 2015).

Thailand
Thai fishing vessels have been documented in Puntland from at
least 2005 to 2009. The Puntland Coast Guard supplied three
officers to protect a Thai trawler owned by the Thai seafood
company Sirichai around 2006 (Puntland State of Somalia Office
of Coast Guard Forces, 2006). The company owned and operated
seven licensed trawlers in Puntland’s waters. The growing threat
of piracy caused Thai vessels to leave Somali waters. In November
2008, the trawler Ekawatnava 5 was sunk by the Indian navy when
it mistook the vessel for a pirate mothership. Fourteen Thai crew
members were killed (United Nations Security Council, 2013).
The Thai Union 3 was hijacked in October 2009 and its crew held
until March 2010. We estimate these trawlers caught 5,495 mt
each year from 2005–2009.

Iran
Iran’s recorded fishing fleet had about 6,363 boats in 2007,
1,296 of which are authorized by the IOTC to fish outside
Iranian waters (Waugh et al., 2011). In recent years, we estimate
Iranian vessels catch about 44,850 mt of tuna and sharks each
year (CI90% = 8,988–104,150 mt). IOTC reports show most of
this catch to be yellowfin and skipjack tuna, and the gillnet
vessels have significant amounts of bycatch including billfishes,
sharks, rays, and mammals (Waugh et al., 2011). Somali officials
have recently focused their attention on fishing by Iranian
vessels, and they formally accused Iran of fishing illegally by
submitting evidence to the IOTC in 2015 (Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission [IOTC], 2015).

AIS Analysis of South Korean Trawl Fleet
Catch records and AIS transmissions suggest seven
South Korean-flagged trawl vessels caught 27,475 mt during
2010–2014, or approximately 5,495 mt of catch attributable
to this fleet. Based on import records, catch consisted largely
of cephalopods (cuttlefish = 20%, squid = 19%). Most fish
catch was emperors (Lethrinidae; 17%), followed by barracudas
(Sphyraenidae; 9%), and grunts (Haemulidae; 7%). Each of these
vessels was present and actively trawling in Somali waters for
an average of 229 days per year (Table 2). During May through
January, these vessels trawled 73 to 87% of days in any given
month. Trawling was reduced during the period of heavy seas
in February through April, occurring during 34 to 62% of days
in these months.
Figure 3 shows the location of trawling; the vast majority
occurred in inshore waters of Puntland because the government
of Puntland has regularly issued trawling licenses to foreign
fleets. Additionally, the continental shelf topology facilitates high
fish abundance. Ninety-five percent of all trawling we tracked
occurred inside the 75 m depth contour (Figure 3).
The mean SOG from all boats during trawling was 3.9 knots.
Multiplying by the assumed width of the trawl for vessels of
comparable size (49 m, Gomez and Jiminez, 1994) and by the
average number of hours trawling per day (8.4 h) and converted
into km2 , we estimate each vessel trawled 3 km2 per day of active
trawling. Multiplied by the number of days trawled per year by
each boat, we estimate this fleet trawled 120,652 km2 during
2010 – 2014. Our robustness check generates a similar estimate.
Total straight-line distance trawled was 2318 km. Multiplied by

Egypt
In the early 1980s, Egyptian trawlers took over the fishing
niche previously filled by the Soviet joint venture SOMALFISH
(Yassin, 1981). We estimate 34 trawlers caught 12,240 mt per year
(2007–2014) and 36 trawlers caught 12,960 mt per year (2003–
2006). These trawlers appear to have obtained licenses from the
government of Somaliland through the mid-2000s. However,
public opinion and law enforcement has shifted against these
trawlers recently. Licenses to Egypt were ended by Somaliland
in 2012 (Government of Somaliland Ministry of Trade and
Investment, 2014). In 2009, two trawlers were arrested By
Somaliland forces in Las Koreh (Anon, 2010b) and another was
arrested in 2014 (BBC, 2014).

Kenya
Since 2004, Kenya has operated trawlers that target prawns near
the mouth of the Juba River along the border with Somalia
(Bocha, 2012). Waldo (2009) reported nineteen illegal trawlers
caught a total of 800 mt annually. The Kenyan prawn fishery has
been accused of contributing to the bycatch of endangered sea
turtles that nest along the Somalia-Kenya border (Megalommatis,
2008). Recently, fishing in these waters has been banned by
the Kenyan government in response to concerns about the
presence of Al-Shabaab.

Greece

TABLE 2 | Days per year spent actively trawling within Somalia’s exclusive
economic zone boundaries for seven South Korean-flagged vessels.

Trawlers from Greece started fishing in Somali waters in the
1960s but we found no reports of their presence between 1983
and 2010. In 2010, two trawlers, the Greko 1 and Greko 2, began
operating and we estimate they catch 447 mt of fish per year.
These two vessels have become controversial. In 2016, Somalia
asked for help from regional ports to prevent the Greko 1 from
landing its catch. At that point, Somali officials denied Greko 1
was legally licensed and the vessel has been under investigation
by FISH-i Africa, a regional information sharing task force (Stop
Illegal Fishing, 2017).
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2014

1

No data

No data
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0

138

2

261

73

0

0

0

3

303

241

271

270

201

4

236

0

No data

No data

No data

5

290

253

242

169

188

6

No data

No data

No data

No data

125

7

No data

No data

296

280

221
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FIGURE 3 | Density of AIS pings during active bottom trawling from seven South Korean-flagged trawlers during 2010–2014.
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the assumed width of the trawl (49 m), a second estimate of the
trawled area is 113,593 km2 .

results were robust to assumptions of catch underreporting and
misreporting. Our approach imposes a brightline (B/BMSY = 1.0)
for the classification of sustainability (above 1.0 = sustainable),
but small changes in reconstruction series could cause a
group to cross that line. Finally, our classification approach
does not distinguish those groups which are need immediate
conservation measures.

Sustainability Analysis
We classify as unsustainable 10 of 17 fish groups included in our
analysis (Figure 4), including swordfish, striped marlin, yellowfin
tuna, longtail tuna, emperors (including the commercially
important spangled emperor, Lethrinus nebulosus), goatfish
(Mullidae), snappers (Lutjanidae), sharks, groupers (Serranidae),
and grunts (including the commercially important painted
sweetlips, Diagramma pictum).
This data-poor approach has limitations that should be
considered. We analyzed groups of fishes that ranged from
taxonomic organization at the species level (e.g., skipjack tuna)
to superorder (e.g., sharks; see Figure 5). For those groups whose
catch series came from catch reconstruction, there is higher
levels of autocorrelation. However, Costello et al. (2012) found

DISCUSSION
Since 1981, foreign fishing in Somali waters has been
characterized by: purse seine and longline distant water
fleets from Europe and Asia that target HMS, fish offshore, and
tend to report to management authority of the IOTC; nearshore
trawling for coastal species by various nations including
South Korea, Greece, Italy, and Kenya; and gillnet or artisanal
fishing by regional fishing nations such as Yemen and Iran that
appear to fish for a wide variety of species, including sardine,
tuna, and sharks.
Both the reality and perception of foreign fishing has
perpetuated instability in Somalia. Somalis have accused foreign
vessels of shooting at them (Katz, 2012), spraying them with
boiling water, and purposely destroying their fishing gear. Some
fishers claim they fear for their lives from aggressive foreign
vessels (Lehr and Lehmann, 2007). Growing public anger has
caused a backlash against foreign fishing. For example, Egyptian
trawlers that had once received legal fishing licenses have recently
been arrested (BBC, 2014). We propose five mechanisms by
which foreign IUU fishing drives instability in Somalia: (1)
foreign competition with domestic fleets for fish, (2) links
between foreign fishing and piracy, (3) effects of nearshore
trawling, (4) conflict between state and federal governments
over modalities for licensing foreign vessels, and (5) a long-term
reduction in livelihood security.

FIGURE 4 | Sustainability classification of commercially important fish groups
caught in Somali waters.

Competition Between Foreign and
Domestic Fishers
The presence of foreign fishing vessels in Somali waters is not
inherently problematic, but if there is strong overlap in the
target species, we expect higher levels of conflict to evolve.
Comparing the catch of commercially important fish groups by
foreign (this study) and domestic (Cashion et al., 2018) fleets over
the past decade (2005–2014), we find overlap to be significant
(Figure 6). Of the 18 species groups caught by foreign vessels,
15 are also caught by domestic fishers. Our sustainability analysis
showed that five of the species groups caught by both foreign
and domestic fishers are currently being fished at unsustainable
levels. These include sharks, emperors, groupers, snappers, and
goatfishes, which equal 56% of domestic catch during the most
recent decade. Furthermore, tuna stocks are targeted by both
fleets, and two of four species commonly caught in Somali waters
are classified as unsustainable by IOTC. The similarity in catch
composition suggests foreign gillnet vessels are likely competing
for access to the same fishing grounds as the domestic fleet,
especially for demersal species such as emperors and groupers.
Our AIS analysis shows foreign trawlers have been operating well

FIGURE 5 | Sustainability analysis for sharks based on estimated B/BMSY
using catch reconstructions for foreign and domestic fleets in Somali waters.
When estimated catch (dashed line) exceeds B/BMSY (solid line), the fishery is
classified as unsustainable.
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brought in substantial currency (Burale, 2005) and targeted any
vessel passing in and beyond Somali water, not just fishing
vessels (Schbley and Rosenau, 2013). Finally, adding to the
complexity, the warlords who justified their actions through
protection of Somalis had actually enabled IUU fishing by
providing armed security and legal means to obtain licenses
(Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2015).
The international community deployed NATO-led naval
vessels to patrol waters around Somalia to tackle piracy, but
very little has been done to stop illegal fishing. Some Somalis
see this as tacitly enabling illegal fishing (African Development
Solutions, 2015). Pirate attacks, which in 2014 were reduced to
zero successful (reported) attacks, have again targeted fishing
vessels. Several Iranian fishing vessels were captured in April
2015, and at least 37 fishers were taken hostage (Oceans Beyond
Piracy, 2015). A second Iranian vessel, likely fishing illegally, ran
out of fuel and drifted onto shore in El-Dheer, an Al Shabaab
stronghold in 2015 (Anon, 2015c). After paying a “fishing fee,”
the crew and cargo were released.

FIGURE 6 | Overlap of catch composition for foreign and domestic fleets
fishing in Somali waters. Total catch per species group calculated from catch
estimates during 2005–2014.

Effects of Nearshore Trawling
Foreign trawlers operated in Somali waters from the mid-1970s
until 1991 as joint ventures. Specially, agreements between the
Somali federal government allowed joint ventures with Italy,
Egypt, Greece, Japan, France, the Soviet Union, Singapore,
and Iraq (Glaser et al., 2015). Most of these licensed ventures
dissolved after 1991 but many of the trawlers continued
operating. Thirty-six trawlers from Egypt operated along the
northern coast. Five Italian vessels belonging to SHIFCO
operated until 2006, at which time South Korean trawlers took
over. Two Greek trawlers, the Greko 1 and 2, have operated since
2010. According to the 2014 Somali Fisheries Law (Article 33.1),
all bottom trawling is illegal. Today, bottom trawling is illegal
under the new Somali Fisheries Law (Article 33.1).
The damage done to the benthic ecosystem is impossible
to assess because there is no scientific baseline for comparison
(Anon, 1976; Stromme, 1984). In this study, we estimate
seven trawlers alone trawled over 120,000 km2 in 5 years. We
argue these estimates are conservative and likely underestimates
because they were strictly derived from observable AIS tracks that
were voluntarily transmitted. While we do not know the specific
effects of this trawling on the Somali marine environment, a
large body of literature on bottom trawling shows tremendous
and long-lasting negative impacts due to high mortality of
bycatch (Alverson et al., 1994), disruption to biogeochemical
systems linking the water column to the benthos (Pilskaln
et al., 1998), and significant reductions in biodiversity and
productivity due to high mortality on the benthic community
(corals, sponges, echinoderms, and mollusks (Dayton et al., 1995;
Kaiser et al., 2006).
Four decades of unregulated and unreported bottom trawling
means there is a high likelihood that considerable ecosystem
damage has already occurred (Glaser et al., 2015). A global metaanalysis showed trawling of the type occurring in Somali waters
(otter trawling) removes 6% of organisms with each pass over an
area (Hiddink et al., 2017), and Kaiser et al. (2006) showed that a
20% recovery of trawl-impacted ecosystems could take more than

within the 24-nm territorial sea reserved for Somali fishers in the
Somali Federal law.
For context, however, it is important to note that fishing has
not been a large contributor to income or diet in Somalia. Current
estimates are that only 30,000 fishers live in Somalia, but there
is a lack of solid, current information on the number of fishers
in Somali fishing communities. Additionally, cultural attitudes
toward fish eating and ocean conditions that hamper fishing
activity in many parts of the year have limited the significance
of fishing to the overall Somali economy (Yassin, 1981).

Piracy
In the literature, piracy is frequently linked to IUU fishing
(Murphy, 2011; Sumaila and Bawumia, 2014). After the
beginning of the civil war in 1991, Somali waters were left without
legitimate capacity for enforcement of maritime sovereignty or
boundary integrity. Organized groups of fishers began targeting
first foreign fishing vessels and later, commercial traffic, partly
in response to the perception that the international community
ignored or even encouraged illegal fishing (Lehr and Lehmann,
2007). Initially, these attacks were limited to small-scale theft. In
1994, two SHIFCO fishing vessels were hijacked and the crew
were held and then released for ransom, leading to an escalation
in pirate tactics (Kulmiye, 2001). These small-scale attacks were
quickly appropriated by warlords with criminal networks and
international financing. These criminals sought to maximize
profit above all else by attacking any vessels passing in and beyond
Somali waters (Hansen, 2011; Schbley and Rosenau, 2013).
At the same time, warlords sold licenses to foreign vessels
in return for protection against pirate attacks (Sumaila and
Bawumia, 2014). By 1998, these agreements had ended because,
for the most part, warlords did not provide the protection they
promised. By the early 2000s, loosely organized pirate gangs
had fully evolved to a highly organized business model that
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vessels immediately, at least some of these vessels returned
2 months later with licenses issued by the Federal Government
of Somalia.
Recognizing the need for clear and comprehensive laws and
regulations, fisheries ministers, policy makers, and international
actors are working to improve and expand legislation around
Somali fisheries. Inshore fisheries development is left to the
discretion of federal member states (e.g., Puntland) and offshore
fisheries are managed by the federal government in coordination
with member states.
Governance mechanisms that promote sustainable
management with effective monitoring and enforcement of
the Somali fisheries sector are needed to support long-term
food, economic, and maritime security along Somalia’s 3,000 km
coastline. However, governance of the Somali fisheries sector is
wrought with challenges.
One such challenge is the lack of continuity between federal
and member state laws and policies. Somalia’s federal fisheries
law is not mirrored in the regional member state laws, creating
jurisdictional conflicts. This ambiguity has enabled states to
disregard federal law in the past; for example, some states
previously issued licenses to foreign vessels or permitted bottom
trawling (which is clearly banned in the federal law). The
federal government, in 2018, requested all prior-issued licenses
be canceled, and federal member states complied. There are
on-going efforts to rewrite the federal fishing law (adopted in
2014) and to update the constitution to make all state laws
subordinate to the federal, but this is a lengthy process and
requires Parliamentary approval.
At one point, disagreement between member states and the
federal government stalled progress toward effective fisheries
governance. Since declaring the Somali EEZ in June 2014,
policy makers have not created a federal fisheries authority
to manage fishing. Meetings between fisheries ministers of the
member states and the federal government between 2014 and
2017 helped build consensus on the role and responsibilities for
management at each level of government. Agreements reached in
April 2014, May 2016, and May 2017 specified that the federal
government would have licensing jurisdiction over HMS in nonterritorial waters. In 2018, a licensing agreement was finally
adopted, but one issue to still resolve is how to divide revenues
from that licensing.
There are ongoing discussions over how to divide licensing
fees between the state and federal governments. While fisheries
experts support earmarking license revenue for building a federal
fishing authority and investing in the Somali fishing sector,
license revenue could also be used to support the security
sector and economic development. These competing needs have
stalled agreement on licensing modalities, which in turn delayed
both the inflow of revenues and implementation of offshore
fisheries management.
Our research shows six nations were fishing in Somali waters
in 2014, but before the peak of piracy, over 13 nations were
actively fishing for HMS inside Somali boundaries. Today,
many foreign fleets (particularly those from the EU) have
expressed interest in acquiring fishing licenses if the Somali
government develops a legitimate and reliable licensing scheme.
In early 2019, the Federal Ministry of Fisheries and Marine

8 years. For the most heavily trawled locations (Figure 3), benthic
communities might never recover before being disturbed again
(Collie et al., 2000).
Unclear governance structures have resulted in conflicting
guidelines for ports in which trawl vessels attempt to land
their catch. In 2015, two trawlers left Mogadishu with a cargo
of fish (Anon, 2015a). These vessels were then inspected in
Mombasa, Kenya. Somali authorities prevented at least one of
these trawlers from landing in Salalah, Oman (EJF, 2015) by
invoking the Port State Measures Agreement, an international
agreement to which Oman is a signatory and which clamps down
on IUU fishing. Eventually, though, one trawler landed its cargo
in Yemen, while the other successfully unloaded in Oman after
presenting a license from Puntland (Stop Illegal Fishing, 2016).
The South Korean-owned vessels continued to fish in Somali
waters intermittently through 2017. Four of the vessels reflagged
to Somalia in 2015. A fifth vessel’s activity ended in dramatic
fashion in 2015 when it sank off the coast of Puntland. The crew
was rescued by the Puntland Maritime Police Force.
In early 2017, seven Thai-owned, Djibouti-flagged trawlers
were operating off the coast of Puntland. Though their operation
is in direct violation of the federal Somali fishing law, they
successfully petitioned the Puntland Government for fishing
licenses and operated for 6 weeks, when they were joined by
a reefer vessel which presumably picked up their illegal catch.
These vessels’ blatant disregard for federal law, in addition to the
suspicion of human rights violations on board including slavery
and human trafficking, led many of the vessels to be detained in
various locations and charges have been filed against individuals
associated with the vessels and the direct or beneficial ownership
companies (Stop Illegal Fishing, 2018).
Recently, bottom trawling has come under scrutiny by
international bodies and by local fishing communities (Indian
Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). Trawling in shallow
water–and hence close to shore–draws attention to their
activities when visible to coastal communities. Some trawlers
have reflagged to Somalia in an effort to circumvent the law
(Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). However,
bottom trawling is illegal for domestic as well as foreign
vessels. Trawlers have come to symbolize the conflict between
domestic and foreign fishing fleets in Somalia (Kulmiye, 2010;
Coastal Development Organization, 2013; Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission [IOTC], 2015). The competition for space in
these productive fishing areas has led to antagonistic behavior
by foreign vessels toward Somalis. Incidents like these could
increase as resources decline, intensifying competition for
dwindling resources.

Conflict Over Licensing Foreign Vessels
Somali authorities have worked to draw international
attention to illegal foreign fishing. In April 2015, the
Somali delegation presented evidence of illegal fishing
at the annual IOTC conference, including vessel tracks,
photographs, and documentation of expired licenses
(Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], 2015). AIS
showed nine Chinese longline vessels fishing illegally
for HMS during March and April 2015 (Glaser et al.,
2015). Although the Chinese delegation recalled their
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Resources issued licenses to 31 Chinese longline vessels to
fish for HMS in the Somali EEZ outside the 24 nm buffer
reserved for Somali domestic fishers, earning $1 million in
revenue for the government. The agreement resulted from
successful negotiations between the federal government and
member states, and it sets the stage for future negotiations on
resource management. But the licensing of these vessels has been
controversial within Somalia and public backlash has occurred
over fears that foreign fishing vessels will outcompete or harm
domestic fishers.

stabilizing the economy and promoting food security. Shortterm investments without long-term planning or may result in
overfishing and declining profits, ultimately exacerbating local
frustration at international actors. Finally, these investments will
fail if the international community and Somali authorities fail to
reign in foreign illegal fishing in Somali waters.
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CONCLUSION
Since 1991, Somalis have not had a viable way to manage the
risks to their domestic fisheries. Illegal foreign fishing provided
a form of moral justification for the rise of piracy to protect
valuable marine resources. But piracy is not an inevitable reaction
to foreign fishing. Conflict with foreign vessels can be reduced
through reliable and explicit incentives for license agreements,
sufficient resources, and political support for community-based
solutions. Stability in Somalia is increasing while pirate attacks
have declined significantly from their peak in the mid-2000s.
Today, international donors and aid agencies are investing
in coastal communities and artisanal fishing businesses. To
succeed, these investments must promote sustainability while
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